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THE PATH FORJAPAN?: AN EXAMINATION 
OF PRODUCT LIABIUTY LAWS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
AND JAPAN 
Abstract: The United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan developed 
their product liability laws based on a common desire to protect consumers. 
Although these regimes are similar in many ways, due to cultural differ-
ences, it seems there will always be differences. U.S. and British strict prod-
uct liability regimes date back to the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Japan's strict product liability regime, however, is still in its infancy. By ex-
amining the development of strict product liability in each of these coun-
tries, focusing on statutory and common law language, as well as the posi-
tion of, structure of, and access to the judiciary, this Note concludes, due to 
the similarities between the United Kingdom and Japan-similarities gen-
erally not existing with respect to the United States-that Japan is more 
likely to develop its product liability regime in accordance with the United 
Kingdom, rather than the United States. 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the globe, nations are shedding their individuality in or-
der to facilitate and encourage economic competition and fairness. 1 
The European Union (EU), for example, was established in part to 
achieve harmonization in many areas associated with commercial ac-
tivities.2 Other nations such as Japan have also heeded to the pressure 
of creating laws in accordance with other nations to ease commercial 
and economic activity.3 
1 See Frank K. Upham, Privatization Regulation: japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative 
and International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 396, 401 (1997); George A. Zaphiriou, 
Unification and Harmonization of Law Relating to Global and Regional Trading, 14 N. ILL. U.L. 
REv. 407, 418-19 (1994). 
2 See generally Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, Belg.-Den.-Fr.-
F.R.G.-Greece-Ir.-ltaly-Lux.-Neth.-POI·t.-Spain-U.K., 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992); see also Council 
Directive of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 1985 OJ. (L 
210) 29,29 [hereinafter EC Directive]. 
3 See Jason F. Cohen, Note, The japanese Product Liability Law: Sending a Pm-Consumer 
Tsunami thmugh Japan's Corporate and judicial "'vrlds, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 108, 148 
(1997) . 
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The development of product liability laws is one area that has 
varied across the globe but is now slowly beginning to converge.4 
Product liability laws generally impose liability on manufacturers, dis-
tributors, and sellers for damages caused by commercial goods.5 To-
day, product liability is often controlled by "strict liability," a no fault 
doctrine.6 Common rationales for this standard are protecting the 
consumer, cost spreading, and placing the responsibility for harms on 
the one in the best position to make a difference.7 
This Note demonstrates the different ways nations have slowly 
begun to implement similar product liability regimes and then ex-
plains how the variations can result in disparate applications. Part I 
outlines the emergence of product liability regimes in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Part II compares and con-
trasts the approaches found in each nation and illustrates the differ-
ences that arise as a result of the variations, despite similar founda-
tions. Part III utilizes the differences and similarities among the three 
nations and the changes in Japan following the passage of Japan's 
Product Liability Act in 1994 (1994 Act) 8 to predict the future path of 
Japanese product liability doctrine. Finally, Part IV concludes that Ja-
pan will most likely follow a path similar to the one taken by the 
United Kingdom. 
1. THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCT LIABILITY LAw IN THE UNITED 
STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND JAPAN 
A. The United States 
Dubbed the "birthplace of product liability," the United States 
generally operates under a judicially-created scheme of product liabil-
4 See generally EC Directive, supra note 2; Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, ja-
pan s New Product Liamlity Law: The Citadel of Strict Liamlity Falls, But Access to Recollery is Lim-
ited /Jy Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 669 (1995); Cohen, supra note 3; Tho-
mas Lundmark, The Restatement of Torts (Third) and the European Product Liamlity Directille, 5 J. 
INT'LL. & PRAC. 239 (1996). 
5 SeeJANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 9 (1994). 
6 See, e.g., EC Directive, supra note 2, at 29; Lundmal'k, supra note 4, at 242-43; Andrew 
Marcuse, Comment, Why japan s New Products Liamlity Law Isn't, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 
365,365 (1996). 
'7 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 
§ 98, -at 692-93 (5th ed. 1984); STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20-21. 
8 The Product Liability Law, Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan), tentatille tmnslation allailable 
at (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http://wwwJef.orJp/news/guidepll.html> [hereinafter 1994 
Act]. 
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ity based on "strict liability" that imposes liability without fault.9 De-
veloping from the Industrial Revolution, U.S. product liability law is 
derived from case law and restatements of law anchored in contract 
and tort.lO It is based on the belief that consumers need protection 
from business and that business should bear the costs of harms 
inflicted on consumers.l1 
1. The Early Years of U.S. Product Liability Law 
Before the onslaught of the Industrial Revolution, commercial 
transactions were relatively personal, and products were generally lim-
ited to hand-crafted items.12 The customer usually knew the source of 
a product and whom to blame if there was a problem.13 Under this 
system, the common law notion of "caveat emptor," or "buyer be-
ware," was the controlling doctrine of commercial activity, making it 
the responsibility of the buyer to inspect goods for defects and poten-
tial dangers. 14 However, the development of machines, the growing 
reliance on mass production, and the addition of new players that ac-
companied the Industrial Revolution created new problems.15 Prod-
ucts became more sophisticated and specialized, making it difficult 
for the average buyer to perform an adequate inspection.l6 
As the problems grew, U.S. courts initially attempted to account 
for them through contract law and the doctrines of expressed war-
ranty of fitness and implied warranty of merchantabilityP The war-
ranty doctrines were restrictive as the only means to recover for de-
9 See Lundmark, supra note 4, at 242-43. 
10 See id.; see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). Due to the diversity among the fifty states, the 
Restatements will be used as the basic standards in the United States for the purposes of 
this Note, with reference to specific states whe1-e appropriate. See Lundmark, supra note 4, 
at 260-63. 
11 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, j., concurring); STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 
22; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 244. 
12 See Lundma1-k, supra note 4, at 242. 
13 See STAPLETON, supm note 5, at 14. 
14 SeeGERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 5 (1993); KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 7, § 95A, at 679; CJ. MILLER & P.A. LOVELL, PRODUCT LIABILITY 78-79 (1977); 
STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 10. 
15 See STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 11. 
16 See id. 
17 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 95A, 96A, at 679-83. Expressed warranties are 
the result of expressed statements by the manufacturer, distributor, or seller regarding the 
quality of a product. See id. Implied warranties hold the seller responsible for the fitness of 
goods for ordinary purposes. See id. 
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fects in products because they were subject to a privity requirement. 18 
Privity is a contract requirement allowing only parties directly involved 
to recover for a breach of contract.19 Privity allowed manufacturers to 
avoid a multitude of claims because the right to recover was restricted 
to a limited group.20 
Winterbottom v. Wright,21 an English case, set the stage for early 
U.S. law upholding the privity requirement. 22 In that case, a coach 
company contracted with the Postmaster General to provide coaches 
for the mail service and to take responsibility for the maintenance of 
the coaches.23 The plaintiff was hired by the Postmaster General to 
drive the coach and deliver the mai1. 24 The driver was subsequently 
injured when the coach collapsed as a result of poor maintenance.25 
The plaintiff sued the coach company, claiming it had failed to prop-
erly maintain the coach, thereby causing his injuries. 26 The court held 
that the driver could not recover from the coach company because 
the plaintiff was not a party to the contract for maintenance between 
the coach company and the Postmaster General,27 The court believed 
that elimination of the privity of contract requirement would open 
manufacturers to claims not only from the people with whom they 
had direct contact, but also bystanders, passengers, and a horde of 
other unknown parties.28 The Winterbottom court found that recogniz-
ing a new claim extending to those without privity would violate the 
seller's expectations and go beyond the scope of the law.29 
As the nineteenth century ended, a new remedy for damage re-
sulting from products began to emerge as courts started to impose 
liability in tort where a supplier had knowledge of a defect in its 
product and placed it on the market anyway.30 Courts also began to 
18 See id. § 96, at 681; Lundmark, supra note 4. at 244. 
19 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 96, at 684; STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 15-16. For 
example, if John Doe bought a car and his wife was injured due to a defect in the car while 
driving, Mrs. Doe would not be able to recover for the resulting injuries because she had 
not been a party to the sale of the car or the contract relating to the car. See KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 7, § 96, at 684. 
20 See STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 15-16. 
21 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109,152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). 
22 See id. at 114,152 Eng. Rep. at 405; KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 96, at 68l. 
23 See Winterbottom, 10 M & W at 109, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 110, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. 
28 See Winterbottom, 10 M & W at 114, 152 Eng. Rep.at405. 
29 See id. at 115, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. 
30 See STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20. 
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recognize liability for "inherently dangerous" products.31 These tort 
theories were considered exceptions to the privity rule, but privity still 
remained a bar to recovery for many product-related claims.32 
The next shift toward more stringent standards for product 
manufacturers occurred in 1916, when recovery was allowed under a 
theory of negligence in MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.33 The facts of 
MacPherson are similar to Winterbottom in that the plaintiff was injured 
and sought to recover from a party with whom he did not have a con-
tractual relationship.34 The defendant had sold a car to a car dealer 
who subsequently sold the car to the plaintiff.35 The plaintiff was in-
jured when one of the wheels collapsed.36 The court did not find that 
the defendant had purposely placed a defective product on the mar-
ket, but rather extended the definition of dangerous product, finding 
that where a defect could have been discovered upon reasonable in-
spection, a plaintiff could recover under a theory of negligence.37 By 
shifting the claim from contract law to tort law and expanding the 
available tort claims, the court dispensed with the privity requirement 
because it is not an element of negligence.38 The court reasoned that 
this approach was appropriate because the defendant was in the best 
position to discover the danger and knew or should have known that 
the car would not subsequently be subject to an adequate inspection 
by the ultimate consumer.39 Therefore, the manufacturer owed a duty 
to the ultimate purchaser to properly inspect the car.40 This case es-
tablished the concept of suing up the chain of distribution, allowing a 
consumer to go past the direct retailer to the manufacturer even 
though no contract existed between the consumer and the manufac-
turer or distributor.41 
Even though the courts were beginning to recognize a need to 
protect the general public from dangerous products, the ability to re-
cover for damages remained restricted because decisions still rested 
31 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 96, at 682-83; STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20. 
32 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 96, at 682-83; STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20. 
33 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); see also STAPLETON, 
supra note 5, at 20. 
34 See MacPherson, III N .E. at 105l. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See MacPherson, III N .E. at 105l. 
40 See id. 
41 See id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 7,'§ 96, at 683. 
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on a theory of negligence or contract.42 The standard under negli-
gence is a reasonableness standard that means if a "reasonable" 
manufacturer would still market the product regardless of the defects, 
no duty of care is violated.43 This determination is often based on a 
cost-benefit analysis: if the costs of inspection or change outweigh the 
benefit-usually economic benefit-the manufacturer is not negli-
gent in placing the defective product on the market.44 If plaintiffs 
could not prove the manufacturer acted unreasonably, no recovery 
was available.45 The negligence standard was problematic for most 
consumers because they did not have the resources or opportunities 
necessary to prove unreasonable conduct.46 
2. Strict Liability: The Modern U.S. Standard 
The first inkling of a new standard for manufacturers, distribu-
tors, and sellers was espoused by Justice Traynor in a concurring opin-
ion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling CO.47 In that case, a waitress was in-
jured when a soda bottle exploded in her hand.48 The case itself was 
decided on negligence grounds, but Justice Traynor asserted that 
public policy demanded recovery for the plaintiff even if negligence 
could not be proven because the manufacturer was in the best posi-
tion to insure against the damage.49 This position was based on the 
theory that the consumer does not have the same opportunity to in-
spect products, the same knowledge to recognize dangers, or the abil-
ity to spread the cost of such dangers.5o This idea of liability imposed 
without fault became known as "strict liability" and was finally ac-
cepted by the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc.51 
42 See STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20-22. 
43 See HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 206--07. 
44 See id. at 207. 
45 See STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20-22. 
46 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynm,J., con-
curring); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 98, at 693; STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 22. 
47 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring); see also STAPLETON, supra 
note 5, at 22; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 244-45. 
48 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 437. 
49 See id. at 440-41 (Traynor,J., concurring); see also STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 22; 
Lundmark, supra note 4, at 244-45. 
50 See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor,J., concurring); see also Lundmark, supra note 4, 
at 245. 
51 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); STAPLE-
TON, supra note 5, at 24. 
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Almost all fifty states have now adopted strict liability in one form 
or another, and it has been incorporated into the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability that pro-
vide decision-making guidance to courts based on case authority and 
legal literature.52 Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
promulgated in 1965, sets out the commonly accepted U.S. standard 
for a seller's liability.53 It applies to anyone who is in the business of 
selling products and sells a product in such a condition as to pose an 
unreasonable danger of physical harm to the user or consumer, or to 
his or her property. 54 Section 402A applies regardless of privity and 
even if "the seller has exercised all possible care. "55 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability expands on 
§ 402A by incorporating principles established through case law since 
the 1960s.56 In accordance with case law, the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
identifies three types of product defects: manufacturing defects, de-
sign defects, and information defects.5' Manufacturing defects are 
present when the product is not what the manufacturer intended.58 
Examples include damaged, physically flawed, and incorrectly assem-
bled products. 59 Products with design defects are those that reach the 
consumer in the form intended by the manufacturer, but something 
in the design makes them dangerous, and foreseeable risks could 
have been avoided with an alternative design.6o Finally, information 
defects are attributed to products that are unavoidably dangerous yet 
useful to society; therefore, they are only defective if appropriate, 
adequate warnings are not attached.61 
52 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § I; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 246, 
260-63. 
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A. 
54 See id. § 402A( I). 
55 See id. § 402A(2). 
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, at 3. 
57 See id. § 2; see also Lundmark, supra note 4, at 251-52. 
58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2(a); see 
also Lundmark, supra note 4, at 251. 
59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2 Clnt. c: 
60 Seeid. § 2(b); see also Lundmark, supra note 4, at 251-52. 
61 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2(c); see 
also Lundmark, supra note 4, at 252. 
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B. The United Kingdom 
The development of product liability law in the United Kingdom 
did not parallel that in the United States even though the systems of 
law have a common foundation.62 In fact, for a long time the United 
Kingdom resisted anything similar to that found in the United 
States.63 Instead, the United Kingdom attempted to maintain a con-
tractual and statutory focus for holding manufacturers responsible for 
harm caused by products.64 In 1932, however, the privity requirement 
was dispensed with in Donoghue v. Stevenson,65 which recognized a 
product liability cause of action in negligence by recognizing a duty to 
consumers.66 In that case, a woman consumed a bottle of ginger-beer, 
purchased by her friend, that contained the remnants of a decom-
posed snail. 67 The bottle was opaque and sealed, thus denying the 
woman an opportunity to inspect the product prior to consumption.68 
The woman sued the manufacturer of the ginger-beer to recover for 
her resulting shock and "severe gastroenteritis. "69 The manufacturer 
was held liable even though there was no contract because a duty was 
owed under the "neighbor principle. "70 This principle is based on the 
forseeability of others being affected by the manufacturer's product 
and holds a manufacturer liable for those foreseeable damages re-
gardless of privity. 71 
Until the latter part of the twentieth century, contract law, negli-
gence law, and statutory law controlled British law concerning recov-
ery for damage resulting from defective products.72 The changes in 
the United Kingdom regarding manufacturer liability since the Indus-
62 See The Right Honorable The Lord Griffiths, M.C., et aI., The Developments in English 
Product Liamlity Law: A Comparison with the American System, 62 TUL. L. REv. 353, 355 (1988); 
Lundmark, supra note 4, at 242-43. 
63 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 355; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 242-43. 
64 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 355.-56. 
65 Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562 (Scot.); see HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 
70-71; MILLER & LOVELL, supra note 14, at 171; STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20; Griffiths et 
aI., supra note 62, at 356. 
66 See Donoghue, 1932 App. Cas. at 580; see also HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 70-71; 
MILLER & LOVELL, supra note 14, at 171; STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20; Griffiths et aI., 
supra note 62, at 356. 
67 See Donoghue, 1932 App. Cas. at 566. 
66 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 580; see also HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 70-71; MILLER & LOVELL, supra 
note 14, at 171; STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20; Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 356. 
7I See Donoghue, 1932 App. Cas. at 580-81; see also HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 70-71; 
Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 358. 
72 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 360-62. 
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trial Revolution have been largely legislative, as opposed to judiciaI.73 
For example, the Sale of Goods Act of 1979 regulated the sale and 
supply of goods,74 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 was 
aimed at preventing sellers from contracting out of terms governing 
the quality of goods.75 In addition, criminal sanctions have been im-
posed for certain trading activities that may be related to the intro-
duction of unsafe goods.76 Until 1987, as far as tort remedies were 
concerned, the law of product liability in the United Kingdom was at 
about the same stage as the United States in 1916 following MacPher-
son.77 
Things began to change for the United Kingdom in 1985 when 
the Council of the European Communities adopted the European 
Product Liability Directive (EC Directive).78 This Directive required 
all Member States to adopt similar measures for the protection of 
consumers.79 The Directive was partially motivated by a desire to 
maintain competition and facilitate the movement of goods within 
the common market.80 The United Kingdom implemented the EC 
Directive through Part I of the Consumer Protection Act of 1987.81 
The EC Directive, however, allows certain provisions to be optionaI.B2 
For example, the adoption of the state-of-art defense was left up to 
each Member State.83 The United Kingdom exercised the option to 
include this defense, allowing manufacturers to escape liability if the 
risks of a product were not known or knowable at the time of produc-
tion.84 
Under the Consumer Protection Act, "product" encompasses any 
goods or electricity, including component parts and raw materials.85 
Producers of component parts or raw materials are exempt from li-
ability, however, if they can show the defect was a result of instructions 
given by the manufacturer of the final product or was due to negli-
73 See id. at 359. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 360. 
76 See id. 
77 See Griffiths et al., supra note 62, at 360. 
78 See EC Directive, supra note 2; see also Griffiths et al., supra note 62, at 369-75. 
79 See EC Directive, supra note 2, art. 19. 
80 See id. at 29; see also Griffiths et al., supra note 62, at 370. 
81 See Consumer Protection Act, 1987, ch. 43, § 1 (1) (Eng.); Griffiths et al., supra note 
62, at 354. 
82 See EC Directive, supra note 2, art. 15. 
83 See id. art. 15(1 )(b); see also Lundmark, supra note 4, at 255. 
84 See Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 4 (e); Lundmark, supra note 4, at 255. 
85 SeeConsllmer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 1 (2). 
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gence on the part of the final product manufacturer.86 The Act im-
poses liability on producers of the product, importers, and anyone 
holding him or herself out as producer by affixing a name, trade 
mark, or other distinguishing feature to the product. 87 Suppliers may 
also be held liable, but only if they fail to reveal the name of the pro-
ducer or importer within a reasonable time of a reasonable request 
for such information.88 A "defect" exists under the Consumer Protec-
tion Act "if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally 
are entitled to expect. "89 Expectations can be determined by examin-
ing the marketing of the product, any warnings or instructions, the 
foreseeable uses of the product, and the information available at the 
time the product left the manufacturer. 90 
C. Japan 
The Japanese legal system has been described as "a hybrid of To-
kugawa tradition, European-influenced civil codes, and American-
influenced laws."91 The "Tokugawa tradition" refers to the stage of 
Japanese legal development that stressed Confucian ideology promot-
ing obedience to hierarchy over the individua1.92 Under this tradition, 
the preferred resolution to conflicts is in favor of the whole with little 
recognition of individual rights.93 Japan has been recognized as a non-
litigious culture, and some commentators cite the Tokugawa tradition 
as the foundation of that culture.94 
Prior to 1994, product liability law, as an independent area oflaw, 
was virtually non-existent in Japan.95 Instead of either adopting a 
product liability statute or creating laws judicially, Japan relied on 
other provisions and characteristics of its existing laws and customs.96 
The compromising nature of the Tokugawa tradition was seen as en-
couraging settlement of any claims as opposed to involving the 
courts.97 Furthermore, the Japanese government did not believe 
86 See id. §§ 1 (3) , 4 ( 1 ) (f) . 
87 See id. § 2(2). 
88 See id. § 2(3). 
89 [d. § 3(1). 
90 See Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 3(2). 
91 Cohen, supra note 3, at 117-18. 
92 See id. at 115-16. 
93 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 672. 
94 See id. 
95 See Marcuse, supra note 6, at 369-70. 
96 See id. 
97 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 120. 
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product liability laws were necessary due to the intense governmental 
regulation of Japanese products that sought to achieve uniformity of 
product design and quality.98 The government viewed regulation as a 
proactive measure to protect consumers and preferred such a meas-
ure to a reactive judicial system that entered the picture only after' an 
accident.99 For accidents that occurred regardless of the safety regula-
tions, the Japanese courts relied on contract and tort provisions of its 
Civil Code that has remained virtually unchanged since its passage in 
1898.100 
The relevant Civil Code provisions, applied to cases involving 
product defects, are Articles 415 and 570 (contract provisions) and 
Article 709 (a tort provision).101 As contract provisions, privity is gen-
erally a requirement of Articles 415 and 570.102 Article 415 imposes 
liability on a seller for harm caused by its product.103 This liability is 
based on a theory of non-performance-by causing harm, the prod-
uct failed to perform as expected and therefore, failed to fulfill the 
contract.104 The seller, however, may escape liability through proof 
that the defect was not present at the sale of the product or by show-
ing that there was no negligence on the part of the seller.105 
In contrast, Article 570 imposes liability on the seller for defects 
present at the time of sale, regardless of fault and thus, is a form of 
strict liability.106 Recovery, however, is limited to those in privity with 
the seller and to the contract price of the product.107 This article acts 
to rescind the contract and allows the consumer to be reimbursed.108 
In the tort realm, Article 709 does not specifically refer to prod-
uct liability cases, but rather sets the general standard for tortious acts 
and reads: "[a] person who intentionally or negligently violates the 
rights of another is obligated to compensate for damage arising there-
98 See id. at 140, 147. 
99 See id. at 141. 
100 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 678; see also Zen taro Kitagawa, Products Li-
ability, in 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (MB) Part 13, § 4.03[1] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 
1989); Marcuse, supra note 6, at 370-72. 
101 See Kitagawa, supra note 100, § 4.03[1] & n.l; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 370-72. 
102 See Kitagawa, supra note 100, §§ 4.03[1] [b], 4.06[1]. 
103 See id. § 4.06[1]; Junko Mori, japan, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
113,114 (Jocelyn Kellam ed., 1995). 
104 See Mori, supra note 103, at 114. 
105 See Kitagawa, supra note 100, § 4.06[2]; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 370. 
106 See Kitagawa, supra note 100, § 4.06[2]. 
107 See id.; Mori, supra note 103, at 114; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 371. 
108 See Mori, supra note 103, at 114. 
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from. "109 This article has been applied to product cases, and because 
it is based in tort, does not require privity of contract.110 Under this 
provision of the Civil Code, the burden is on the injured party to 
prove fault. 111 Furthermore, a plaintiff must prove fault "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" as opposed to the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard found in U.S. civil cases. ll2 A defendant can refute a 
claim by attacking causation, pleading unforeseeability, or ralSlng a 
state-of-art defense.ll3 
In 1975, Japan began to specifically address the problem of 
product liability when the legislature proposed the Draft Model Law 
on Products Liability (1975 Draft).114 If adopted, this act would im-
pose liability on producers regardless of fault or privity.ll5 Further-
more, liability would be extended to sellers and distributors who 
would have the burden of proving they were not responsible for the 
defect.ll6 In addition, the 1975 Draft proposed new, expanded discov-
ery proceduresll7 and required producers to contribute to a compen-
sation fund that would pay for damage awards.llS The idea of a com-
pensation fund was not new in Japan but rather would have been a 
codification of past practices.119 The 1975 Draft has not been adopted, 
and its fate is presently uncertain.120 
The 1994 Act was later passed primarily as a reaction to domestic 
and international pressures rather than out of concern for consumers 
and individual rights.121 The domestic pressure arose from the 1993 
elections when a new party gained control of Japan for the first time 
since World War 11.122 Prior to this shift in power, the government was 
pro-business and pro-regulation.123 Manufacturers had little trouble 
convincing the government that product liability laws were unneces-
sary because the level of regulation insured that the likelihood of 
109 Kitagawa, supra note 100, § 4.05 [1] n.l; see Mori, supra note 103, at 114. 
110 See Kitagawa, supra note 100, § 4.05 [1]; Mori, supra note 103, at 114. 
III See Mori, supra note 103, at 115; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 371. 
112 See Mori, supra note 103, at 115. 
113 See Marcuse, supra note 6, at 372. 
114 See id. at 379. 
II5 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 706--07; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 379. 
118 See Marcuse, supra note 6, at 379-80. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. at 380. 
121 SeeCohen, supra note 3, at 145-46,150. 
122 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 688; Cohen, supra note 3, at 153. 
123 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 688; Cohen, supra note 3, at 148. 
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product defects was significantly less than that found in the United 
States.124 The new government, however, was more consumer-oriented 
and advocated deregulation.125 Although the old party is back in 
power, voter behavior has caused it to continue the commitment to 
consumers.126 
On the international front, when the EC Directive was adopted 
by its Member States, Japan became the only industrialized nation 
without a product liability law.127 In addition, Japan had long endured 
international criticisms of its regulation of industry.128 Critics claimed 
the regulation created barriers to foreign entry into the Japanese 
market because the standards were so much higher than in other na-
tions. 129 These criticisms, coupled with the recognition of the impor-
tance of a global economy, fueled the new government's support of 
deregulation.130 With the prospect of deregulation, Japan finally de-
cided it was time for a product liability law. 131 
The 1994 Act was inspired by the EC Directive and essentially 
embraces the same concepts.132 It also incorporates ideas found in the 
1975 Draft that are in symmetry with the EC Directive.133 The 1994 
Act, however, does not incorporate the 1975 Draft's proposal for ex-
panded discovery procedures, and it relies on the Civil Code for mat-
ters on which the law is silent.134 For example, although the law now 
imposes liability for a defect regardless of fault, the 1994 Act is silent 
on the issue of burden of proof, leaving a heavy burden on the plain-
tiff to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defect existed at the 
time the product left the manufacturer. 135 Without the expanded dis-
covery procedures, this burden is still very heavy because it is difficult 
to obtain any information about the product.136 
124 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 148. 
125 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 688. 
126 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 154. 
127 See id. at 148. 
128 See id. at 140-41. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 148, 149-50. 
131 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 152. 
132 See Mori, supra note 103, at 116; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 382. 
133 See Marcuse, supra note 6, at 382. 
134 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 6; Cohen, supra note 3, at 159, 176; Marcuse, supra 
note 6, at 388. 
m See Mori, supra note 103, at 115-16; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 388. 
136 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 706-08; Mori, supra note 103, at 115-16; 
Cohen, supra note 3, at 176. 
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The 1994 Act applies to "movable property [that is] manufac-
tured or processed. "137 It imposes liability on "any person who manu-
factured, processed, or imported the product as business"138 and any-
one who puts "his name, trade name, trade mark or other feature ... 
on the product presenting himself as its manufacturer" or who could 
be mistaken as the manufacturer.139 The 1994 Act does not impose 
liability on a mere seller.140 Under the 1994 Act, defect is defined as 
"lack of safety that the product ordinarily should provide, taking into 
account the nature of the product, the ordinarily foreseeable manner 
of use of the product, the time when the manufacturer, etc. delivered 
the product, and other circumstances concerning the product. "141 
Article 4 of the 1994 Act allows for a state-of-art defense142 as well as a 
defense for component part manufacturers who can show the defect 
is a result of compliance with instructions from the manufacturer of 
the whole product or a result of negligence on the part of the manu-
facturer of the whole product.143 
II. A COMPARISON OF THE THREE NATIONS 
The product liability laws of the United States, the United King-
dom, and Japan are very similar on the surface.144 They appear to 
place the consumer first, and they attempt to influence manufactur-
ers, importers, and sellers to take steps to protect consumers.145 
Each nation has established tort remedies for damage caused by 
defective products. l46 By finding a cause of action in tort, privity is no 
longer required, and therefore, a consumer or user who has not dealt 
directly with the manufacturer can recover for damage resulting from 
137 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2 (1). 
138 Id. art. 2(3)(1). 
139Id. art. 2(3) (2). 
140 See id. art. 2(3). 
141 Id. art. 2 (2). 
142 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 4(1). 
143 Id. art. 4 (2). 
144 See generally 1994 Act, sUfrra note 8; Consumer Protection Act, sUfrra note 81; RE-
STA~EMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, supra note 10. 
145 See generally 1994 Act, sUfrra note 8; Consumer Protection Act, sUfrra note 81; RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, sUfrra note 10; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, supra note 10. 
146 See 1994 Act, sUfrra note 8, art. 3; Consumer Protection Act, sufrra note 81, § 2(1); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A. 
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a defective product.147 This tort remedy imposes strict liability, or li-
ability without fault, on manufacturers, relieving the consumer of the 
need to prove the manufacturer acted un.reasonably,148 The plaintiff is 
left with the burden of proving that the defect existed at the time it 
left the manufacturer, regardless of the care taken, and that the dam-
age resulted from the defect. 149 
Beneath the general principles of product liability laws, however, 
the laws and the application of the laws begin to deviate.15o The lan-
guage of the statutes and judicially created laws treat some elements 
of product liability claims differently.151 In addition, the judicial sys-
tems, the reasons behind the adoption of the laws, and the culture of 
each nation contribute to variations in application and outcome.152 
A. Differences Among the Provisions of the Laws 
A significant difference among the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan is whom the product liability laws can affect.153 
Under § 402A, the seller is liable to the consumer even if the seller did 
not manufacturer the product.154 Sellers are also accountable under 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts,155 whereas in the United Kingdom, li-
ability is imposed on the seller of a defective product only if the seller 
fails to give an injured consumer the name of his or her supplier 
within a reasonable time of a request for such information.156 InJapan, 
under the 1994 Act, liability is restricted to manufacturers, processors, 
importers, and those placing distinguishing marks on the product so 
as to be identified as a manufacturer, processor, or importer.157 Sellers 
147 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 1; HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 70-71; STAPLETON, su-
pra note 5, at 20. 
148 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 3; Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 2(1); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A. 
149 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 3; Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 2(1); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A; Mori, supra note 103, at 115-16; 
Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 364; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 388-89. 
150 See infra notes 153-230 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra notes 153-81 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 182-230 and accompanying text. 
153 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2; Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 2; RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 1; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A. 
154 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A. 
155 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, sujJra note 10, § l. 
156 See Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 2(3). 
157 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2. 
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are not included in this liSt.15S Unlike the United States, where the 
entire chain of distribution can be held accountable and left to allo-
cate responsibility amongst themselves, in the United Kingdom and 
Japan, the exclusion of sellers leaves a hole in which the upper levels 
of the distribution chain can place blame, making it more difficult for 
the consumer to recover.159 
Another important difference among the nations is what is cov-
ered by the product liability laws.160 Under the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, "product" was not specifically defined, but it did include un-
processed agricultural items such as poisonous mushrooms.161 The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts has defined "product" as "tangible personal 
property" that includes unprocessed materials.162 The 1994 Act, on 
the other hand, is limited to "moveable property manufactured or 
processed, "163 and the Consumer Protection Act excludes agricultural 
items and game that have not "undergone an industrial process. "164 
One effect of this variation is a restriction on the causes of action 
available in the United Kingdom and Japan as compared to the 
United States.165 
The defenses available to a party subject to liability in the three 
nations are another key difference.166 For example, the Consumer 
Protection Act and the 1994 Act both provide that a producer shall 
not be liable when the state of scientific knowledge at the time of sale 
of the product was such that the defect was not known or knowable.167 
158 See id. 
159 See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2 onto a; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 
supra note 10, § 402A ont. c. 
160 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, 
§ 1 (2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 19; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A onto e. 
161 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A onto e. 
162 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, §§ 19(a), 19 
onto b. 
163 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2 (1). 
164 Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 1 (2). 
165 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, 
§ 1 (2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 19 ont. b; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A cmt. e. 
166 See, e.g., 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 4(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, 
§ 4(e); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2 ont. d; 
STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 239-42; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 255-56. 
167 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 4(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, 
§ 4(e). 
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This is known in the United States as the state-of-art defense.l68 The 
burden on British producers is further reduced by the need to only 
show the information was not available within the industry, as op-
posed to being held to the information known to the scientific com-
munity.l69 
The availability of the state-of-art defense in the United States, 
however, is not as straightforward. Comment k to § 402A suggests a 
standard of liability stemming from "the present state of human 
knowledge."170 Over the decades, the majority of states have allowed 
the state of scientific knowledge to be considered or used as an 
affirmative defense, but .when it is considered, it is not always a deter-
minative factor.l7l Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, state-of-art 
evidence may be admitted, but it is not dispositive.1'2 This means that 
in some jurisdictions, U.S. manufacturers, unlike their Japanese or 
British counterparts, can be held liable for defects in their products 
even if it was impossible to discover the defects at the time of sale.173 
Furthermore, even if a state-of-art defense is available to a U.S. manu-
facturer, many states do not allow the defense if the manufacturer did 
not issue post-sale warnings when the information became known.1'4 
Yet another portion of the Consumer Protection Act and the 
1994 Act that differs from U.S. product liability law is the existence of 
a statute of repose.1'5 A statute of repose "establish [es] a fixed or as-
certainable time period within which a products liability suit must be 
168 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, sujJra note lO, § 2 cmt. 
d. This is also known as the "developmental risks defense." See Lundmark, supra note 4, at 
255-56. 
169 See STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 239-42; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 255-56. 
170 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A cmt. k. 
171 See generally PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE: A FIFTy-STATE COMPENDIUM 
(Morton F. Daller ed., 1998) [hereinafter PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE]. 
172 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2 nnt. 
d. 
173 See generalZv PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE, supra note 171; see also 1994 Act, 
supra note 8, art. 4(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 4(e). 
174 See generally PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE, supra note 171; see also HOWELLS, 
supra note 14, at 216. 
175 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 5(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 1 (1) 
(giving effect to the EC Directive); EC Directive, supra note 2, art. ll; Stephen]. Werber, 
The Constitutional Dimension of a National Products Liabilit;v Statute of Repose, 40 VILL. L. REv. 
985, app. at lO53-55 (1995); see generally, PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE, supra note 
174. Section 1 (l) of the Consumer Protection Act incorporates the EC Directive that pro-
vides that each Member State "shall provide in their legislation" for a ten-year statute of 
repose. See Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 1 (1); EC Di1'ective, supra note 2, art. 
11. 
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brought or be forever barred."176 While a limited number of states 
have adopted statutes of repose, most states have not done so, or have 
repealed such statutes.177 In the states that have adopted statutes of 
repose, some are limited to improvements to real property, and an-
other group is left open-ended by setting the limit at the end of the 
"useful life" of the product.178 In contrast, the United Kingdom (pur-
suant to the EC Directive) and Japan have each set a ten-year statute 
of repose.l79 In each of those countries, a consumer is barred from 
bringing a product liability action if the product has been in circula-
tion for more than ten years.180 This again places a limit on the avail-
ability of recovery.181 
B. Differences Among the Applications of the Laws and the Ability to Benefit 
from the Laws 
Not only is the language ofthe laws different, but the culture and 
political structure of each nation also influence the application of 
product liability laws.l82 In addition to the variations in the provisions 
of each nation, significant differences exist in the judicial process, 
consumers' access to court, and each country's emphasis on litiga-
tion.183 
A substantial difference among the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan is the emphasis on litigation and the preferred 
methods of handling disputes or complaints.184 Litigation is a com-
176 4 AM. PROD. LIAB. 3D, § 47:55 (1990). 
177 See Werber, supra note 175, app. at 1053-55; see also PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REF-
ERENCE, supra note 171, at 21 (explaining Arizona found its statute of repose unconstitu-
tional) . 
178 See, e.g., PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE, supra note 171, at 121, 153, 161,215, 
267. 
179 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 5(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, 
§ 1 (1); EC Directive, supra note 2, art. 11. . 
180 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 5(1); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, 
§ 1 (1); EC Directive, supra note 2, art. 11. 
181 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 5 (1); EC Directive, supra note 2, art. 11. 
182 See, e.g., HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 232; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 672; 
Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 359-62; Mori, supra note 103, at 121; Cohen, supra note 3, 
at 129; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 367. 
183 See, e.g., HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 232; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 672; 
Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 359-62; Mori, supra note 103, at 121; Cohen, supra note 3, 
at 129; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 367. 
184 See HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 232; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 672; 
Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 359-62; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 367. 
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mon occurrence in the United States.I85 In 1990, over 19,400 product 
liability cases were filed in federal courts alone.I86 This contrasts with 
the 150 similar cases filed in Japan since World War II prior to the 
passage of the 1994 Act.187 
In the arena of product liability, the United States has preferred 
to create its laws through the judicial process, therefore reinforcing its 
reliance on civil courts to resolve conflicts.188 For half a century, the 
United States has not only relied on civil courts to resolve conflicts 
between consumers and manufacturers, but it has relied on the doc-
trine of strict liability that gives consumers a great advantage over 
manufacturers.I89 The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has pre-
ferred to handle product liability disputes through statutes and con-
tract law.190 Although contract law is an area of civil law, it is a much 
more restrained area than strict liability in tort because it requires 
privity.19I In addition, the British statutes that have been passed to 
help account for harms to consumers are often criminal in nature; 
thus, the recourse is between the manufacturer and the government, 
rather than the manufacturer and the consumer.192 
In contrast to both the United States and the United Kingdom, 
the culture of Japan has traditionally relied on methods other than 
the courts to resolve conflicts.193 The Tokugawa tradition emphasizes 
the group and resolving disputes through means that the modern 
world refers to as alternative dispute resolution.194 Since the change in 
government, this tradition appears to be shifting toward a more indi-
vidual and consumer-oriented culture, but it is not evident how far 
this shift will go.195 Regardless of the increased desire to litigate, the 
costs of litigation in Japan create such a barrier that many will con-
185 See HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 232. The attitude towards litigation in the United 
States has been described as stemming from a "frontier mentality." See id. "[Wlhereas in 
the past Americans would have shot someone who injured them, they now take them to 
court." Id. 
186 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation 
System--and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, app. B at 1292 (1992). 
187 See Cohen, supra note 3, at lIS & n.59. 
188 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 359; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 242-43. 
189 See STAPLETON, supra note 5, at 20-22; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 245. 
190 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 359-60. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 672; Cohen, supra note 3, at 129-30; Mar-
cuse, supra note 6, at 367. 
194 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 672; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 367. 
195 Compare Cohen, supra note 3, at 153 & n.31S with Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, 
at 704-05. 
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tinue to rely on methods of settlement because it is cheaper and more 
accessible.196 In addition, like the United Kingdom,Japan has focused 
on methods other than civil remedies through strict governmental 
regulation of industries.197 
Other important differences rest in who can get to court.198 In 
the United States, it is relatively easy for a consumer to have his or her 
day in court. 199 Product liability cases in the United States are gener-
ally handled on a contingency fee basis that allows a plaintiff to bring 
a suit and pay the attorney only if the plaintiff prevails. zoo The attor-
ney then receives a percentage of the award.20l This gives the attorney 
discretion as to which cases to bring, but if a plaintiff can find an at-
torney wilHng to take the risk, the plaintiff can get to court.202 If the 
defendant wins, the plaintiff rarely pays anything, not even his or her 
own attorney's fees. 203 Things are not so easy in the United Kingdom 
or in Japan, where contingent fees are not used.204 
In addition, other costs create problems for potential litigants in 
the United Kingdom and Japan.205 For instance, in the United King-
dom, the losing party usually must pay the other side's court costs, 
including attorney's fees. 206 This can be an expensive result, particu-
larly without an award out of which to pay.207 In Japan, litigants must 
pay very high retainers and court costs that increase as the potential 
awards increase.208 Therefore, the more egregious the damages pre-
sented in a case, the more the litigant must pay before getting to 
court. 209 Moreover, there is a limited number of attorneys in Japan.210 
As a result of a strict licensing process, there is roughly one attorney 
196 See Mori, supra note 103, at 121; Cohen, supra note 3, at 129. 
197 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 140,147. 
198 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 709; Griffiths et aI., supra note 65, at :n5; 
Mori, supra note 103, at 121; Cohen, supra note 3, at 125. 
199 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 709; Cohen, supra note 3, at 125. 
200 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 709. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. at 708-09. 
204 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 375; Mori, supra note 103, at 121. 
205 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 709; Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 375; 
Mori, supra note 103, at 121; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 368. 
206 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 375. 
207 See id. 
208 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 709-11; Mori, supra note 103, at 121; 
Cohen, supra note 3, at 125; Marcuse, supra note 6, at 368. 
209 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 709-11; Cohen, supra note 3, at 125. 
210 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 676-77. 
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per 8,000 Japanese citizens.211 Compared to Japan, the United States 
has approximately twenty-five times the number of attorneys servicing 
a population that is only twice as large.212 
Once an injured consumer gets into court, there are more hur-
dles to conquer.213 Each nation places the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff, but that burden varies.214 Unlike plaintiffs in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, aJapanese plaintiff must prove his or 
her case beyond a reasonable doubt in the civil system as well as in the 
criminal system.215 Additionally, in Japan, allegations must specifically 
point to what part of the product was defective.216 This is very difficult 
to achieve, however, because Japan has very few discovery proce-
dures. 217 Japanese discovery is limited to situations where: 
(1) the party holding the document is required by law to 
surrender the document to the moving party; 
(2) the other party relied on what is supposedly written in 
the document; or 
(3) the nature of the document is such that it states the 
legal relationship between the parties or it was prepared for 
the interests of the moving party.218 
These limitations make it very difficult for the plaintiff to have 
enough information to know which particular part of a product was 
defective, thus restricting the ability to recover.219 
Not only does the burden on the plaintiff vary among the three 
nations, the body assessing the sufficiency of the evidence is also dif-
ferent. 22o In the United States, product liability actions are most often 
211 See id. at 676. 
212 See id. This number works out to approximately one attorney for every 640 AIneri-
cans. 
213 See MILLER & LOVELL, supra note 14, at 273-75; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, 
at 696,707-08; Mori, supra note 103, at 115. 
214 See MILLER & LOVELL, supra note 14, at 273-75; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, 
at 696; Mori, supra note 103, at 115; see also EC Directive, supra note 2, art. 7. 
215 See MILLER & LOVELL, supra note 14, at 273-75; Mori, supra note 103, at 115. 
216 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 696. 
217 See id. at 707-08. 
218 Zen taro Kitagawa, Structure and Operation of jajJanese Law, in 1 DOING BUSINESS IN 
JAPAN (MB) § 3.04[ 4] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1989). 
219 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 707-08; Mori, supra note 103, at 115; 
Cohen, supra note 3, at 126-27. 
220 See HOWELLS, supra note 14, at 231-32; Yasuhiro Fluita, japan, in 1 PRODUCTS LI-
ABILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL MANUAL OF PRACTICE § 6.1.1 (Warren Freedman, Esq. ed., 
1987); Griffiths et ai., supra note 62, at 375; Lundmark, supra note 4, at 258; Cohen, supra 
note 3, at 127-28. 
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decided by a jury, whereas in the United Kingdom, a single judge is 
usually responsible for the disposition of product liability cases.221 In 
Japan, there is no jury system; therefore, judges are responsible for 
decision-making.222 This difference plays a major role in the outcome 
of product liability cases because judge awards are "notoriously" lower 
than jury awards.223 The difference between jury awards and judge 
awards is generally attributed to the sympathetic angle juries bring to 
a case that a seasoned judge does not. 224 
In addition to the body awarding compensation, differences exist 
among the three nations as to what can be awarded.225 For example, 
in the United Kingdom, punitive awards are only granted in three 
specific situations: when there is oppressive behavior by public ser-
vants, when a tort is committed with the intention of profiting from it, 
and when the damages are expressly sanctioned by statute.226 The 
Consumer Protection Act of 1987 does not specifically sanction puni-
tive damages for product defects; therefore, punitive damages cannot 
be recovered unless one of the other exceptions is proven.227 In Ja-
pan, punitive damages are prohibited.228 The Japanese civil system is 
purely intended to account for damage, not to punish.229 In the 
United States, on the other hand, some jurisdictions allow for puni-
tive damages that can raise award amounts above and beyond the 
value of the damage incurred in an effort to punish the manufacturer, 
distributor, or seller.23o 
III. ANALYSIS-THE PATH AHEAD FORJAPAN 
The differences between the United Kingdom and the United 
States illustrate that the imposition of strict liability does not mean 
that product liability doctrines will develop in the same direction. 231 
The relative newness of the 1994 Act leaves open to question the ul-
timate development of the product liability doctrine in Japan.232 
221 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 375. 
222 See FlUita, supra note 220, § 6.1.1; Cohen, supra note 3, at 127-28. 
223 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 375. 
224 See id.; see also Lundmark, supra note 4, at 258. 
225 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 393-94; Mori, supra note 103, at 115. 
226 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 393-95. 
227 See id. at 395. 
228 See Mori, supra note 103, at 115. 
229 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 713. 
230 See id. at 712. 
231 See supra notes 144-230 and accompanying text. 
232 See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 670. 
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There have been few judicial decisions based on the new law, and in 
the first three years of its enactment, only ten cases were filed. 233 
Changes by manufacturers and within the government, however, sug-
gest the direction in which Japan may head.234 In addition, the simi-
larities between the United Kingdom and Japan may be predictive of 
Japan's path. 
A. Changes in japan Since Passage oj the 1994 Act 
Since the passage of the 1994 Act, manufacturers have taken 
various steps toward producing safer products and being able to com-
pensate for damage resulting from their products.235 Generally, manu-
facturers have initiated research and implementation of better warn-
ings for their products so consumers know of potential dangers 
before purchase.236 In addition, although a state-of-art defense is 
available under the 1994 Act, recalls have increased, and a few prod-
ucts have been taken off the market. 237 Manufacturers have also be-
gun to acknowledge their liability and settle claims in cases similar to 
ones that were fought before.238 In addition, the sale of product liabil-
ity insurance has risen in an effort to guarantee funds to pay for dam-
age.239 
Furthermore, in accordance with the previous settlement orien-
tation of Japan, corporations have created dispute resolution centers 
to facilitate recovery for damage by products.24o The centers conduct 
investigations into the defect of the product and then negotiate with 
the manufacturer on behalf of the consumer.241 There is little or no 
233 See Cohen. supra note 3, at 175; Report on PL Law Gives l'>fixed Reviews, MAINICHl 
DAILY NEWS, july 17, 1998, at 14, available in LEXIS, World Library, MAINWS File; see also 
Court arders McDonald's Japan ann to pay 100,000 yen, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, july 5, 1999, 
available in LEXIS, japan Country Files (court awarded one quarter of requested amount 
for injury incurred after consuming orange juice from McDonald's establishment); Sakai 
city ordered to pay 45 mil. yen over food poisoning, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 10, 1999, 
available in LEXIS, japan Country Files (court awarded just over one half requested 
amount for food poisoning resulting from 0-157 strain of E-coli bacteria in school food). 
234 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 160-72; Industl) News: Nippon Cement Orders 400 MetalDe-
tectors, COMLINE-CONSUMER GOoDs,june 24, 1999, available in LEXIS,japan Country Files. 
235 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 160-72. 
236 See id. at 164-65. 
237 Seeid. at 166--67; see also 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 4(1). 
238 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 161-63. 
239 See id. at 167. 
240 See id. at 163-64. 
241 See id. at 163. 
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cost to the consumer.242 The consumer may choose to go to the cen-
ter's arbitration panel if not satisfied with the result of the negotia-
tion, and if not satisfied there, the center will help the consumer liti-
gate.243 Any information gathered during the center's process may be 
used later in court.244 This is significant given the high costs of going 
to court because the consumer will not have to rely on the attorney to 
gather all the information, thereby speeding up the process and sav-
ing attorney's fees. 245 
Recent actions by the Japanese government also illustrate the 
impact of the 1994 Act. 246 Since the passage of the 1994 Act, more re-
sponsibility has been placed on the manufacturers and away from the 
government.247 The Ministry of Trade and Industry has begun to de-
regulate by allowing manufacturers to conduct their own 
certifications.248 In addition, the government has considered meas-
ures to further protect consumers in contract transactions. 249 Al-
though this is a different area than the 1994 Act and the product li-
ability laws at issue in this Note, it is indicative of the shift in Japan 
towards the consumer, for whom product liability laws generally ac-
count.250 
B. The United Kingdom as a Guide but Not a Mirror 
The similarities between the U.K product liability regime and 
the new Japanese law suggest that as the 1994 Act is applied, the re-
sults will be more similar to the United Kingdom than the United 
States.251 Many of the areas in which the United Kingdom differs from 
242 See id. at 164. 
243 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 163-64. 
244 See id. at 164. 
245 Seeid. at 129, 164. 
246 See id. at 172-73; Agent)' slows down progress of consumer-protection bill: Review Needed to 
Win Support, Sakaiya Contends, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 15, 1999, at 3, available in LEXIS, World 
File, NIKKEI File [hereinafter Agent)' slows down progress 1; japan Trade Ministry to Ease Prod-
uct-Safety Regulations, ASIA PULSE, Mar. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, World Library, APULSE 
File. 
247 See japan Trade Ministry to Ease Product-Safety Regulations, supra note 246; cf Behrens 
& Raddock, supra note 4, at 688. 
248 See japan Trade Ministry to Ease Product-Safety Regulations, supra note 246. 
249 See Agent)' slows down progress, supra note 246, at 3; Gover'nment seeks to protect consumers 
with new contract bill, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Aug. 15, 1997, at 14, available in LEXIS, World 
Library, MAINWS File. 
250 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 154. 
251 See gerlerally 1994 Act, supra note 8; Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81; EC Di-
rective, supra note 2. 
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the United States are the same areas in which Japan varies from the 
United States.252 The most significant areas are the exclusion of sellers 
from liability, the reliance on judges instead of juries, the adoption of 
statutes of repose, the lack of punitive damages, and the traditionally 
preferred methods of handling product liability disputes. 253 
The exclusion of sellers from liability is significant because, un-
like the United States, where the seller is equated with the manufac-
turer, the retailer in the United Kingdom and Japan is on equal foot-
ing with the consumer.254 This indicates the acceptance of leaving 
some of the burden on the consumer.255 Unlike the United Kingdom, 
Japan still excludes the seller even if the importer is not known, thus 
essentially allowing the consumer to be left without recourse if a for-
eign manufacturer is judgement-proof.256 The existence of statutes of 
repose illustrates the same notion of being more pro-business than 
the United States because an innocent victim is still innocent ten years 
and a day after the product is put into circulation, but the United 
Kingdom-by virtue of the EC Directive-and Japan do not allow the 
innocent plaintiff to recover after ten years.257 
The traditionally preferred approaches to handling product li-
ability disputes and elements of the respective judicial systems also 
suggest what path Japan may take.258 Unlike the United States, where 
product liability laws developed out of a concern for consumers and 
by virtue of judicial decisions, the laws in the United Kingdom and 
Japan were only partially motivated by such a concern and have pri-
marily developed from legislative actions and external forces. 259 The 
similarities of these traditions suggest that the continued develop-
ment of product liability law in Japan will remain as constrained as it 
is in the United Kingdom.26o In addition, in contrast to the United 
252 See supra notes 144-230 and accompanying text. 
253 See id. 
254 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2(3); Consumer Protection Act, supra note 81, § 2; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. e; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A cmt. c. 
255 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. 
e; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, § 402A cmt. c. 
256 See 1994 Act, supra note 8, art. 2(3); Consumer Protection Act, slljJm note 81, § 2. 
257 See 1994 Act, supm note 8, art. 5(1); Consumer Protection Act, supm note 81, 
§ 1(1); seealsoEC Directive, supmnote 2, art. 11. 
258 See, e.g., EC Directive, supm note 2, at 29; see also Behrens & Raddock, supm note 4, 
at 687-88; Griffiths et aI., supm note 62, at 369-75; Cohen, supm note 3, at 148-50. 
259 See EC Directive, supra note 2, at 29; see also Behrens & Raddock, supra note 4, at 
687-88; Griffiths et aI., supm note 62, at 369-75; Cohen, supm note 3, at 148-150. 
260 See Griffiths et aI., supra note 62, at 359. 
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States, the United Kingdom and Japan rely on judges for disposition 
of product liability claims and do not allow punitive damages.261 
These elements will restrain the awards granted to injured consumers, 
thus providing less incentive for manufacturers to change than exists 
in the United States.262 
Regardless of the similarities with the United Kingdom, however, 
without drastic change, Japan will always be unique, at least in relation 
to the United States and the United Kingdom. 263 japan's uniqueness 
is illustrated by the areas in which it differs from both the United 
States and the United Kingdom.264 Consumers attempting to bring 
claims under the 1994 Act will still face high retainer fees and court 
costs and will still be limited by the number of attorneys practicing in 
Japan.265 In addition, once in court, plaintiffs are still required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defect existed at the time the 
product left the manufacturer.266 Moreover, as explained above, the 
complete exclusion of sellers from the 1994 Act leaves the consumer 
with little recourse if the importer is unknown and it is not possible to 
reach a foreign manufacturer.267 
CONCLUSION 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan all nowoper-
ate under a theory of strict liability for the disposition of product li-
ability cases. Although the standard is the same, slight differences 
among the laws and the countries bar the three from being identical. 
The United States implemented the strict liability standard long be-
fore the others and has had time to develop and modify its applica-
tion. The United Kingdom has been operating under such a standard 
for twenty years since the change was mandated by the EU. Japan, on 
the other hand, only recently imposed such a standard on its com-
mercial industries and has not had time to -fully identify in what direc-
tion it will head. 
Although there is no fool-proof way to predict the direction of a 
new law, examination of the existing laws and systems of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan can help predict the path of 
261 See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text. 
262 See id. 
263 See supra notes 144-230 and accompanying text. 
2&! See id. 
265 See supra notes 196-212 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra notes 153-59, 214-16 and accompanying text. 
267 See supra notes 153-59, 254-56 and accompanying text. 
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the 1994 Act. Such a review suggests that Japan is more likely to apply 
its product liability law like the United Kingdom. Similar to the 
United Kingdom, Japan relies on judges to make its decisions, as op-
posed to a sympathetic jury. It has imposed a statute of repose and 
excludes the seller from those liable under the 1994 Act. Further-
more, tradition indicates that Japan will always try to handle matters 
in ways other than going to court. 
The uniqueness of Japan , as compared to these nations, however, 
will always playa role in the 1994 Act's application and will continue 
to create barriers to Japanese consumers. The high court costs and 
limited number of attorneys will continue to restrict the number of 
claims that can be brought under the 1994 Act. The stringent "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof will also create problems 
that are not found in the United States or the United Kingdom. In 
sum, although Japan was partially motivated by a desire to assimilate 
its product liability laws with the rest of the world, external factors and 
its choice of provisions will continue to prevent Japan from fully as-
similating to the Western world. 
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